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1. Introduction 
There is a popular belief among decentralists that if local governments have the power to 
generate and spend revenue, without relying on central government funding, their 
expenditure will be pro-poor and will improve the lives of local people.  Such views have 
influenced recent calls for greater decentralisation in developing countries in general and 
Africa in particular.   However, evidence from Ghana casts some doubts on this view.  A 
brief comparison of the expenditure and revenue patterns of the poorest and richest local 
governments there suggests that local governments are not inherently pro-poor and that 
locally generated funds might be used in ways that do not reflect the needs of the locality 
as a whole.  Thus the fiscal devolution view of decentralisation appears to be out of kilter 
with reality. To discuss this issue, the three sections in this paper summarise the 
assumptions and perceived benefits of decentralisation, describe decentralisation in 
Ghana, and analyse the revenue and expenditure patterns of the Kumasi Metropolitan 
Authority and the Kasena Nankana District Assembly.  
 
2. Decentralisation and local governance 
Decentralisation involves the transfer of power, whether political, administrative or 
fiscal in one of four forms: Deconcentration (the handing over of administrative or 
managerial responsibility to sub-national governments); Delegation (establishing public 
enterprises and other semi-autonomous bodies to manage sectors like utilities); 
Devolution (the transfer of decision-making authority); and Privatisation (the transfer of  
                                                 
1  PhD candidate. The author is grateful to Kenneth Wemochiga and Owusu Mensah for assisting in 
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hitherto state-managed corporations to the private sector) (Martinussen 1997:210-211).  
The underlying assumptions of decentralisation are:  
 Sub-national governments are closer to the people; 
 Sub-national governments know what their people want; 
 Sub-national governments have local information about resources, the incomes 
of their citizens, and local business conditions in their areas of jurisdiction; 
 Sub-national governments can be influenced in their decisions/actions by local 
stakeholders; and 
 Sub-national governments are accountable to their communities. 
 
Based on these assumptions, proponents believe that decentralisation leads to the 
following beneficial outcomes (See Smoke 2003; World Bank 2003 for detailed 
discussion): 
 
 Improved ‘allocative efficiency’ - what will best suit local people at least cost; 
 Improved service monitoring by both sub-national governments and local 
people; 
 Improved participatory governance;  
 Improved redistribution of income ; 
 Improved resource mobilisation; 
 Improved service provision and infrastructure; and 
 Improved local economic development and poverty reduction.  
 
Given the enormous support decentralisation and local governance enjoys among 
development planners, there is the need to periodically evaluate its impacts. One of the 
key propositions for decentralization (and recurrent desire among development planners) 
is its claimed ability to enhance revenue generation at the local level and, thus, to ensure 
that local governments are adequately resourced.  With enough resources, decentralists 
believe, local governments can provide the necessary infrastructure and services to 
ensure rapid poverty reduction (see, for example, UN-Habitat 2001; Bird 1995). 
However, several evaluations have concluded that in the Third World, especially in 
Africa, little revenue is generated at the local level.  Annually, sub-Saharan African cities 
generate only US$14 per capita compared to US$2,906 in the highly industrialised 
countries and US$153 in Asia (UN-Habitat 2001). As such, there is a current flurry of 
interest in how to increase local revenue mobilisation in Africa. What is often taken for 
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granted is how existing revenue is used and whether the expenditure and revenue patterns 
of local governments are pro-poor.  The prevailing assumption is that local revenue is 
used in ways that lead to the reduction of poverty levels.  Efficiency requires that the 
validity of this assumption be ascertained before rushing to generate more revenue.  
Ghana provides a good ‘laboratory’ to conduct this ‘experiment’ because it has a long 
history of decentralisation. 
 
3. Decentralisation in Ghana 
As part of the economic reforms that were implemented in Ghana in the 1980s, a new 
system of local governance was adopted.  There are currently 170 local governments 
charged with the responsibility of promoting local economic development.  Based on 
population size, these local governments may be regarded as metropolitan (settlements of 
over 250,000 people), municipal (settlements of over 95,000 people), or district 
assemblies (settlements of over 75,000 people).  There are 6 metropolitan authorities, 39 
municipal authorities and 125 district assemblies (Obeng-Odoom 2009).  These local 
governments face several problems, including the lack of requisite technocrats, especially 
planners; logistical constraints; and, the lack of autonomy from central government 
(Lentz, 2006; Mensah 2005).  Of all these problems, revenue generation is the most 
challenging, prompting many decentralists and planners (e.g. Mensah, 2005) to suggest 
possible ways of attaining more revenues for the assemblies.  But, again, how effectively 
the little revenue generated has been put to use remains an unanswered question.  
 
Financial trends: Two local governments compared 
The revenue and expenditure patterns of one of the richest local governments in Ghana – 
the Kumasi Metropolitan Authority – was analysed alongside one of the poorest, the 
Kasena Nankana District Assembly.  In the Kasena Nankana District Assembly, capital 
expenditure has decreased over time, from 83% in 2003 to 12.5% in 2006, while 
recurrent expenditure (internal costs of running the council) has increased from 17% to 
over 87% over the same period, as shown in table 1: 
 
Table 1: Capital and Recurrent Expenditure in Kasena Nankana District Assembly 
Year Capital expenditure as a share 
of Internally Generated Funds 
(IGF) 
Recurrent expenditure as a 
share of IGF 
2003 83.0% 17.0% 
2004 94.7% 5.3% 
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2005 90.0% 10.0% 
2006 12.5% 87.5% 
Source: Kasena Nankana District Assembly, 2007 
 
A similar trend can be observed in the revenue and expenditure patterns of the relatively 
rich local governments in Ghana.  These trends are the same in the richest local 
government too.  At the Kumasi Metropolitan Authority, there is insufficient effort to 
spend municipal funds in a way to ensure that the poor might benefit.  The revenue and 
expenditure statement for the year 2008 shows that total recurrent expenditure (49.4%) 
was almost the same as total capital expenditure (50.6%).  Such expenditure patterns 
evidently suggest that local governments are paying more attention to administrative 
issues like printing, photocopying and furnishing local government offices than direct 
capital investment in development projects that would ensure improving the living 
conditions of local people.  
 
Central government grants to local governments are also far from being spent in a pro-
poor manner.  Table 2 shows that until 2006, the Kasena Nankana District Assembly 
spent the bulk of its revenue on ‘good governance’, which, from the reports of the 
assembly, seems to be defined as the administration of local government offices.  
 
Table 2:  Distribution of expenditure from government grant in Kasena Nankana 
Year Education Health Good Governance 
2003 15.8% 2.7% 81.5% 
2004 10.4% 24.0% 65.6% 
2005 22.3% 11.5% 66.2% 
2006 17.1% 64.3% 18.6% 
Source: Kasena Nankana District Assembly, 2007 
 
Interestingly, there was a significant decline in the share of central government grant that 
is used for ‘good governance’ in 2006.  It is not immediately clear what might have 
caused this decline.  A possible explanation is that some items of expenditure had been 
incorrectly classified prior to 2006 and this error was corrected in 2006.  It may be asked 
whether that explanation represents the end of the evidence about the lack of pro-poor 
local governance? 
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Related concerns exist.  One other aspect of the nexus between local finance and poverty 
reduction that gives cause for concern is the nature of revenue collection.  One key area 
where government can influence the distribution of income in the local economy is 
through taxation.  Land taxation, for example, can serve as a vehicle for the redistribution 
of wealth because it falls on assets that are (disproportionately) owned by more wealthy 
citizens.  Revenue from land taxes could be invested in the provision of healthcare, 
agriculture and education to drive the local economy in ways in which the poor can 
benefit.  However, though local governments in Ghana have the power to levy property 
rates, little is actually collected.  
 
Tables 3 and 4 show the sources of funds to the Kasena Nankana District Assembly and 
the Kumasi Metropolitan Authority respectively.  In both cases, a government grant is 
the biggest source of revenue, accounting for an average of over 90% of revenue in 
Kasena and over 65% in Kumasi.  Other important sources of funds are fees from 
sources like lorry parks and street parking, and fines imposed by the law courts.  
Licenses extended to people, such as those who hawk their wares or display them in 
kiosks, also bring some income to the local governments.  Rates are very low in Kasena, 
accounting for less than 1% of revenue from 2003 to 2006.  
 
Table 3:  Sources of Funds to the Kasena Nankana District Assembly 
Source 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Grant 89.7% 95.3% 95.4% 94.4% 
Fees and Fines 8.1% 3.8% 3.3% 0.3% 
Miscellaneous 0.5% 0.0% 0.2% 0.6% 
Licenses 0.9% 0.3% 0.6% 0.8% 
Rent 0.5% 0.2% 0.3% 0.5% 
Investment 
Income 
0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 3.0% 
Lands 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
Rate 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 
Source: Kasena Nankana District Assembly, 2007 
  
Table 4:  Sources of Funds to the Kumasi Metropolitan Authority 
Source 2006 2007 20082 
Grants 75.9% 75.9% 44.6% 
Fees/Fines 9.3% 9.3% 17.5% 
Licenses 5.8% 5.8% 15.4% 
Rates 5.6% 5.6% 16.7% 
Rent 1.7% 1.7% 2.4% 
Lands 1.1% 1.1% 2.9% 
Miscellaneous 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 
Investment 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 
Source:  Kumasi Metropolitan Authority, 2009 
                                                 
2  These are projections. 
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The implication is that the gap between rich and poor may be widening because the rich 
and owners of property are not paying as much in taxes as by law they should.  This 
situation has negative implications for the distribution of income in the country as a 
whole. Some recent surveys, conducted in 1998, 1999 and 2009, show that the income of 
the poorest 10% of the people in Ghana has reduced from 2.4% to 2.0% (UNDP 
2009:197; UNDP 2001:184).  Simultaneously, the share of the income of the richest 10% 
of the population has increased from 29.5% in 1998 to 30.1% in 1999 and 32.8% in 2009 
(UNDP 2001; 2002; 2009).  International evidence shows that such inequality has 
adverse effects for economic growth, happiness and poverty reduction (Fosu 2008; 
Birdsall et al. 1994; Stilwell and Jordan 2007).  
 
4. Conclusion 
So is decentralisation in Ghana pro-poor?  The evidence considered thus far cannot be 
said to be conclusive.  Nevertheless, it suggests that there are not sufficient compelling 
reasons to believe that the practice of decentralisation is propitious as far as equity and 
local economic development are concerned.  Clearly, the problem with local government 
finance in Ghana is not only increasing the amount of locally generated revenue but also 
ensuring that the existing ‘stock’ of local revenue is expended in ways to ensure a 
reduction in income inequality and poverty levels at the local level.  
 
To meet this aspiration, some lessons can be learnt from the participatory budgeting 
process in Porto Alegre, Brazil.  There, ordinary citizens lead the process of determining 
their local needs.  This system, according to informed observers (e.g. Social 
Development Family 2003), has radically changed a techno-bureaucratic budgeting 
procedure to a ‘techno-democratic’ process in which common people play a significant 
role in determining ways of generating resources and how resources already generated 
should be utilized to shape their future. 
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